Fake calendar invites are hijacking Google work accounts

Fake Google Calendar invites hijack work accounts, even with two-factor login switched on

From the HARD Situation Room · First reported

Material Security says the campaign has run since mid-August, sending calendar invites, often from real accounts the victim already deals with. A fake Google sign-in page relayed passwords and two-factor codes to Google as they were typed, giving the attackers a live session. Material says the activity appears to have dispersed, but warns it may return. Its figures cover only its own customers, and the report includes no statement from Google.

What to do this week

  1. Never sign in from an invitation.If an event, or the link inside it, asks you to log in, play a voicemail, open a document or pay something, close it. Open Google yourself using a bookmark or by typing the address, and look for the item there. If it is from someone you know, check with them on a number you already have. Their account may be the one that's been taken over.
  2. If you already entered your password, act now.From a different, trusted device, change your Google password. Then follow Google's guide to securing a compromised account[2], sign out every device[3] you don't recognise, and remove any app access[4] you didn't grant. Tell your IT contact or whoever runs your Google Workspace, because a session can be misused before the password is changed.
  3. Move to a passkey or security key where you can.The FIDO Alliance, which sets the standard, says a passkey[5] is tied to the genuine site, so a lookalike page can't use it. Google explains how to sign in with a passkey[6]. Keep texted codes as a backup only if you must, since a fallback you can be tricked into using weakens the protection.
  4. If you run the family office's IT, tighten the calendar and be ready to react.Material's earlier advice for Google Workspace is to change the Calendar setting "Add invitations to Calendar" so events appear only from invitations a person has accepted. It says this stops spam from strangers but not invitations from a compromised known sender. Material also urges being able to revoke sessions and app permissions within the hour, and reviewing the Workspace audit logs promptly. Ask whoever supports you in writing whether they can.

Spotting a convincing invitation from someone you trust, in the middle of a busy day, is hard to do alone. Having someone who watches for this and knows who to call is what private cybersecurity is for.

Another invitation to be wary of is a surprise video call from a friend's account. See the FaceStealer fake video meeting scam.

What happened

Since mid-August, a phishing campaign has been sending Google Calendar invitations that lead to a fake Google sign-in page. According to Material Security, a US email security company, the page doesn't just collect a password. It passes the password, and any two-factor code the victim enters, straight to the real Google as they are typed. The attackers end up with a signed-in session, and the victim sees nothing unusual.

That session can reach the person's email and files in Google Drive, and can be used to approve other apps to act in their name. Material says the invitations often arrived from an organisation the recipient already deals with, because the attackers had first taken over real accounts and then mailed everyone in those accounts' contacts. The report we're working from is a sponsored article by Material, published by BleepingComputer[1]. It includes no statement from Google, and the numbers come only from Material's own customers.

Calendar invite phishingTracked by Material Security as Operation CloudFire
Severity
High Live sessions captured despite two-factor login
How it arrives
A Google Calendar invite, often BCC'd and often from a known sender, with a link to a fake sign-in
Typical excuses
Voicemail notices, requests for proposals, court summonses, missed payments
Active since
Mid-August 2026
Current status
Appears to have dispersed in early November; lures have moved to Drive file shares. Material says it may return.
Scale (Material customers only)
68,676 messages blocked and 897 domains taken down in one month
Google's statement
None in the report
What's known.All figures are Material Security's, as reported by BleepingComputer in a sponsored article. Nothing here has been independently confirmed.
The full story3 more sections

How the trick works

Most people have learned that a link in an email can be fake. Few treat a calendar invitation the same way. Material says the invitations were often sent in a way that hid the other recipients, and most of their links ran through Google's own link redirector, so the first address a security tool sees belongs to Google. Some waves used Google share links or Drive file links instead.

The link then passes through a Cloudflare check, sometimes using Cloudflare's genuine widget, before the fake sign-in appears. Material says the sign-in page is assembled in the browser after that check, which leaves little for automated scanners to inspect. The attackers also registered lookalike domains only days before using them and discarded them quickly.

Two-factor login is still worth having. But in this attack the victim completes the genuine checks themselves. Material says the fake page relayed text-message codes, authenticator-app codes, Google's number-matching prompt and phone-based account recovery as they arrived.

A familiar name on an invitation proves very little. The sender's account may already belong to someone else.

Who is affected

Material describes the targets as corporate Google users, and its customers are businesses. That covers anyone whose family office, company, foundation or practice runs on Google Workspace, and the executives and assistants who live in those calendars. Nothing in the report says personal Gmail accounts were targeted, but the same trick would look identical to a person receiving it.

The risk doesn't stop with the person who clicks. Material says attackers used each hijacked account to send invitations to its saved contacts. A parent, an adviser or a supplier who is hijacked becomes the believable sender for the next round. Material counted 8,570 compromised sender addresses across 6,354 domains among its customers, with sending following US business hours.

What isn't known

Material says the campaign has dispersed, with lures shifting from calendar invitations towards Google Drive file and document shares, but it doesn't call it over. It says rebuilding is cheap, the attack kit is public, and the operator left an unfinished Microsoft 365 version in the code. Material reports no rise in other lures, which doesn't rule out a return.

We also can't say how many people were actually compromised. The counts above are of messages blocked and addresses seen, not confirmed victims. And because the article is a sponsored piece, the framing comes from a company that sells protection against exactly this.

Timeline
  1. HARD publishes its article, at High.

References7
  1. ^ BleepingComputer (). “Google Calendar phishing campaign hijacks sessions, bypasses MFA”. Sponsored article by Material Security: the attack method, timeline, Operation CloudFire figures, current status and recommended defences.
  2. ^ Google Account Help. “Secure a hacked or compromised Google Account”. Google's steps for recovering a compromised account.
  3. ^ Google Account Help. “See devices with account access”. How to review and sign out devices.
  4. ^ Google Account Help. “Share some access to your Google Account data with apps from other developers”. How to review and remove third-party app access.
  5. ^ FIDO Alliance. “FIDO Passkeys: Passwordless Authentication”. Passkeys are tied to the site they were created for, so lookalike sites cannot use them.
  6. ^ Google Account Help. “Sign in with a passkey instead of a password”. How to use a passkey with a Google account.
  7. Material Security (). “The quiet phish: stopping calendar invitation attacks”. An earlier Material article on calendar invite phishing, the source of the Workspace 'Add invitations to Calendar' setting advice. It does not cover this campaign.

Situation Room articles are updated as events develop: updates are added to the timeline, and never edited away. Follow them by email or RSS.