Hijacked GitHub accounts stole secrets from at least 1,806 projects

Hijacked GitHub accounts planted code that steals cloud and software publishing keys

From the HARD Situation Room · First reported
aikido.dev: wfx-loot campaign pushes CI secret stealer to tens of thousands of repositories
Screenshot: aikido.dev

Aikido counted 61,764 GitHub projects that received a test request and found signs the malware ran in at least 1,806. The attacker often undid the change and deleted the record of the run, so a project can look clean even after its keys were exposed.

Current event. First reported . Details may change as more becomes known; updates will be added to the timeline.

What to do this week

  1. Ask your developer to check the project history.Start at 10 November. Look for the audit-notes request from a branch named “wfx-docs”. Check later changes to build, test and install scripts, including changes already undone. A gap in the Actions run numbers immediately after a suspicious change is reason to investigate.
  2. Secure the account that sent the request.Even if the request was all you found, revoke the stolen token and check the other projects that account could edit. Review its security log, connected apps and access keys. Remove unfamiliar access. GitHub’s account recovery checks[5].
  3. Replace keys wherever the stealer ran or probably ran.Have the team remove the malicious change, then revoke and replace every credential the affected job could reach, including cloud and software publishing keys. Ask the cloud administrator to check for new keys and changes to who can sign in. The malware could leave another way into AWS or Azure after the original key was replaced.
  4. If you use Fly.io, check the deployed app too.Ask whether an app deployed through the dashboard exposed its Git project history. If it did, have the developer exclude that history, redeploy and replace any credentials ever saved in the project. Fly.io’s instructions for customers[4].

What happened

On 11 November, a change appeared in a GitHub project maintained by drunomics. Twelve seconds later, the project’s own bot account undid it. When StepSecurity checked the history in GitHub Actions, the service that runs jobs such as software tests, it found run 1963 followed by run 1965. The missing run, 1964, was the one for the suspicious change. StepSecurity’s account of the missing run[1].

That gap is worth asking your developers about. From 10 November, an attacker used stolen GitHub credentials to make changes under the names of people and bots already trusted to work on projects. In some projects, the attacker planted a program called wfx. It looked for the keys an automated job uses to do its work, including keys for cloud accounts and for publishing software. Aikido’s investigation[2].

GitHub wfx campaignWhat the counts measure
Hijacked accounts
4,837
Projects that received a test request
61,764
Projects where the malware ran
At least 1,806 in Aikido’s detailed findings. Its summary gives at least 1,835.
What’s known. Aikido gives both figures for runs. The Hacker News reported the lower figure[3], also citing Aikido.
The full story3 more sections

What to search for

Aikido lists these signs. Search every project your accounts can change, from 10 November on. Aikido’s list of signs[2].

  • A pull request titled “docs: dependency audit notes”, or a branch called “wfx-docs”.
  • Commits titled “ci: refresh build cache”, “chore: add ci helper” or “chore: add dependency audit workflow”.
  • Short-lived branches named “chore/” followed by eight random characters.
  • A missing number in the Actions run history. The attacker deletes the run and its log, so a gap is often the only trace.

If you find the stealer ran, treat every key that job could reach as stolen. Replace them all, including cloud roles.

What the request tells you

The first sign was a proposed edit, called a pull request, titled “docs: dependency audit notes”. It added a short text file. Receiving that request tells you someone had taken control of a credential belonging to the account that sent it. To find out whether the stealer ran, your developers need to check what happened next, including changes that someone later undid. StepSecurity’s findings[1].

Who is affected

If an outside developer maintains your website or app, include their account in the check. Aikido counted 10,431 test requests in projects the sending account could edit through a collaboration or an organisation membership. Ask about accounts used to automate work, too. The drunomics change came through one of those accounts.

Fly.io, a hosting provider, traced some of the stolen credentials to files that customer apps had inadvertently made public. It contacted the customers whose tokens it knew had been used and changed how it builds apps from GitHub. On 13 November, Fly.io said its attempt to revoke all user tokens for its GitHub app had stopped partway through. Fly.io’s notice and follow-up[4].

Timeline
  1. HARD publishes its article, at High.

References5
  1. ^ StepSecurity (). “WFX Phantom: The GitHub Actions Secret Stealer That Deletes Its Tracks”. Documents the drunomics sequence, the use of bot accounts, signs of execution and the malware’s ability to retain cloud access.
  2. ^ Aikido (). “wfx-loot campaign pushes CI secret stealer to tens of thousands of repositories”. Primary investigation with counts of accounts, probes and likely runs, including two different lower bounds for runs.
  3. ^ The Hacker News (). “Attacker Used 4,837 Hijacked GitHub Accounts to Run a CI Secret Stealer in 1,806+ Repositories”. Reports Aikido’s 1,806 figure and distinguishes the initial test requests from projects where the malware ran.
  4. ^ Fly.io (). “Security: GitHub tokens exposed by apps deployed from GitHub”. Confirms one source of stolen tokens, gives customer instructions and records the interrupted revocation in a 13 November addendum.
  5. ^ GitHub. “Preventing unauthorized access”. GitHub’s guidance for reviewing account logs, keys, app permissions, collaborators and project changes after suspected compromise.

Situation Room articles are updated as events develop: updates are added to the timeline, and never edited away. Follow them by email or RSS.