Rogue ScreenConnect clients were planted on hundreds of PCs
Rogue ScreenConnect clients planted on hundreds of PCs; update technician clients to 26.6.5
Attackers used the remote-control software that IT providers use to manage customers' computers, ScreenConnect, to plant rogue copies on hundreds of PCs. Huntress counted 288 computers across 48 organisations in the first wave, and a second wave on 13 November reached 205 more across 41. ConnectWise's fix for a related client flaw is ScreenConnect 26.6.5, released in September.
What to do this week
- Update every technician client to ScreenConnect 26.6.5 or later.That covers each technician's machine, each host client and each access agent. The server on its own is not enough. ConnectWise says on-premises partners should upgrade the server to 26.6.5, then reinstall host clients and update access agents. If you cannot patch yet, remove the TransferFiles permission from roles and session groups, as ConnectWise advises.
- Turn off the RMM+ extension unless you need it.Versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 are the affected ones. If you must keep it, set a strong access key first. Also check for the other extensions ConnectWise disabled: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, and the Password Link variants.
- Look through the panel's history.Check Run Command and Toolbox for jobs nobody started, and for guest sessions that sent or ran files. Huntress suggests keeping a copy of the session database before you delete any fake sessions.
- Check computers for leftovers, using a tool that does not run through ScreenConnect.Look for a second ScreenConnect client, a scheduled task called TrapWatch, a folder at C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap, and a startup entry called RelayTrapLiteAlert. Do not run the toolkit's own cleanup scripts, because they can switch it back on. Isolate any machine that shows these signs.
- End sessions and rotate credentials from a clean device.End active ScreenConnect web sessions, revoke the sign-in sessions your identity provider holds for technicians, and rotate ScreenConnect and technician passwords. The toolkit steals session logins, so the old ones need to be ended too.
If a company looks after your computers, ask it in writing whether it uses ScreenConnect, which version its technician clients run, and whether it has checked for the RMM+ extension.
What happened
Attackers used the remote-control software that IT providers use to look after customers' computers to plant rogue copies on hundreds of machines. The toolkit is called SCKit. ScreenConnect, made by ConnectWise, lets a technician see and control a computer from somewhere else, and the attackers ran their commands through the provider's own ScreenConnect panel, the web console where technicians send jobs to customer machines.
- Severity
- High Rogue clients on hundreds of PCs, reached through IT providers' panels
- Fixed in
- ScreenConnect 26.6.5, for the server and for every technician and host client
- Remove
- RMM+ extension 1.0.31 and 1.0.32, unless you need it
- Scale
- 288 computers across 48 organisations in the first wave; a second wave on 13 November hit 205 across 41
Huntress, a security firm, first saw the activity on 11 November. About a third of the affected computers were hit in the first ten minutes of that wave. A second wave on 13 November used new servers. Microsoft has published its own analysis of the toolkit, and
Once on a machine, the malware keeps a hidden second ScreenConnect client running. It tells Microsoft Defender to skip certain folders, and it runs a watcher every ten seconds that stops the real ScreenConnect client from connecting, so the rogue one takes its place. When a technician connects to an infected computer, the malware tries to steal that technician's web login cookie and use it to reach other machines the technician can manage. Huntress says it has not seen that second step work in practice. Microsoft warns that the infection can also reach the technician's own workstation.
Fake sessions named after crypto exchanges, such as KUCOIN-SRV and LAPTOP-BINANCE, have appeared on at least 118 self-hosted ScreenConnect servers. Huntress has seen no harm from them so far, but it thinks they could be bait for technicians who are tempted to open a crypto server.
It recommended that technician clients run version 26.6.5 or later, and said activity against on-premises systems continues where the identified extensions stay enabled.
The full story1 more section
Who is affected
Anyone whose computers are managed by a company that uses ScreenConnect. That includes IT providers and managed service providers, which run the software for many customers from one console, and any business or family office that runs its own ScreenConnect server. One compromised console can reach every customer machine that provider manages.
Three things raise the risk. The first is a technician client older than 26.6.5. The flaw CVE-2026-84869 lets someone in an active session send a file that the technician's client then runs, with no prompt for the technician. ConnectWise rates it 9.9 out of 10, and the US cybersecurity agency CISA lists it as used in attacks. Huntress reported on 16 November that attackers used it against MSP technicians.
The second is the RMM+ extension, a third-party add-on that lets other management tools send commands through ScreenConnect. Versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accept a blank access key when none has been set. Huntress says the blank key bypassed ScreenConnect's own user accounts, roles and two-step login. The Register describes the two-step bypass as something that could happen, and has not confirmed it. ConnectWise says about 400 partner environments had an RMM+ family extension installed, and that it disabled five third-party extensions where it could do so remotely. It says the extension being installed does not by itself mean a compromise.
The third is a provider who has not checked either. ConnectWise has warned that disabling extensions and resetting credentials may not remove software or access that attackers have already left on machines.
Timeline
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HARD publishes its article, at High.
References9
- Huntress (). “SCKit Worm Installs Rogue ScreenConnect Clients and Session Cookie Relays Across Hundreds of Endpoints”. Attack chain, timeline of both waves, affected versions it names, RMM+ flaw, session cookie relay and recommended actions.
- ConnectWise (). “ScreenConnect 26.6.5 Security Patch”. CVE-2026-84869, CVSS 9.9, server fix 26.6.5, on-premises upgrade steps and host client and access agent updates.
- Microsoft Security (). “SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions”. Attack chain, session cookie theft, Defender exclusions, technician workstation risk, extension list, and cleanup advice.
- The Register (). “Hackers exploiting ScreenConnect plugin flaw to spread malware across hundreds of PCs”. About 400 partner environments with an RMM+ family extension, five extensions disabled where possible, RMM+ flaw, and the MFA point as a possibility.
- Huntress (). “Attackers use Crypto Exchange Names to Disguise Unauthorized Sessions on 100+ ScreenConnect Servers”. Fake crypto exchange sessions on at least 118 self-hosted servers, session names, no malicious activity seen yet, bait risk.
- Huntress (). “CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files on MSP Technician Accounts”. Exploitation against MSP technicians, fix in 26.6.5, updating the server alone does not fix it, TransferFiles interim step.
- The Hacker News (). “ScreenConnect Attacks Target at Least 288 Endpoints Across 48 Organizations With Rogue Clients”. Feed summary only (article returned 403): ConnectWise disabling five extensions, no evidence of infrastructure compromise. Not verified.
- The Hacker News (). “SCKit Malware Turns ScreenConnect Support Sessions Into Potential MSP Attack Paths”. Feed summary only (article returned 403): Blackpoint Cyber says the toolkit exploits CVE-2026-84869. Not verified.
- The Hacker News (). “ConnectWise Warns ScreenConnect Attacks Continue as SCKit Targets Unpatched Systems”. Feed summary only (article returned 403): ConnectWise 17 November update, 26.6.5 recommendation, on-premises activity continues. Not verified.
Situation Room articles are updated as events develop: updates are added to the timeline, and never edited away. Follow them by email or RSS.

